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Abstract 
 
 
Defense cooperation agreement between Indonesia and Singapore has 
been signed on April 27th 2007 in Tampak Siring, Bali by both 
country’s defense Minister, signifying a further comprehensive 
agreement based on the content of the DCA (Defense Cooperation 
Agreement). This defense agreement, in addition of being a 
continuation of other previous defense cooperation such as Military 
Training Area in 1995 until 2003, is also a further initiative of 
Singapore in order to build a mutually beneficial cooperation. In fact, 
this agreement has also been packaged with extradition agreement 
which was the initiative of Indonesia. Although the agreement has been 
signed and agreed by both countries, this agreement was not ratified by 
Indonesian House of Representatives. Thus, this research will explain 
about factors or variables that causes the failure of Singapore defense 
diplomacy. This research uses liberalism perspective, defense 
diplomacy and bilateral diplomacy concept. The employed research 
method is analytical descriptive method. Data is collected through 
interview with 7 informants including academicians, practioners, and 
other related expert. The data is also obtained from various literatures. 
Based on 4 defense diplomacy goals variables such as Diplomacy, 
National Interest, Defense Instrument Usage, Peacetime and Potential 
Enemy, this research finds that Defense Cooperation Agreement in 
2007-2017 has not been succsesful yet because there was a difference 
between Indonesia’s and Singapore’s national interest. The difference 
came from the division in Indonesia between its government and 
parliament where the Government prioritized beneficial cooperation 
while the Parliament prioritized sovereignty principle. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the context of traditional studies, defense 
is often interpreted as protecting the state 
from external physical threat (military). 
However, the current global development 
has also placed importance on non-military 
or non-traditional threat against the state 
(Kementerian Pertahanan, 2015). As part of 
the effort to defend against that threat, states 
will usually increase their military power 
and capabilities in order to strengthen their 
defense. One of the efforts is by involving 
other states. In this case, cooperative 
security can be an example of inter-linkage 
between one state and others in defense 
security framework.  
One of the instruments to achieve state 
defense goal is through defense diplomacy. 
Defense cooperation and defense 
diplomacy is one of Singapore’s foreign 
policy agendas (Mindef Singapore, 2018). 
Singapore wove many defense cooperation 
with countries they consider to be potential 
such as the Five Power Defense 
Arrangement (FPDA) States, United States, 
China, India, Taiwan, and other countries 
including their neighbor: Indonesia. 
Indonesia’s relations with Singapore has 
been woven for long and officially started 
in September 1967 (Kementerian 
Sekretariat Negara RI, n.d.). From the 
opening of diplomatic relations, to bilateral 
cooperation that alludes to various fields of 
social, political, cultural, tourism, 
education, and security, Singapore 
considers Indonesia as a strategic partner 
especially due to the interdependence 
between both countries’ economy. 
Singapore is a small country with an area 
of 712.4 km² or only 1% of Indonesia’s 
1,904,564 km² territory (Kementerian Luar 
Negeri RI, n.d.). Therefore, Singapore 
became a state that realizes the importance 
of strengthening its defense. As such, it can 
be inferred that Singapore is a country that 
strives to build its defense sector. This is 
evidenced from Singapore’s defense budget 
that consistently spends 3% of its GDP 
compared to Indonesia that only spends less 
than 1% for its defense budget. Even in 
Southeast Asia, Singapore is the strongest 
state in terms of military capabilities based 
on its Defense Range and Military 
Expenditure (Darwanto, 2015). Hence, in 
order to strengthen its defense capabilities, 
Singapore must cooperate with other 
countries. Despite being the smallest 
country in Southeast Asia, Singapore 
managed to become the strongest country in 
Southeast Asia in terms of defense and 
military. In line with this idea, Singapore 
cooperates with powerful countries that 
they consider to be potential partner in 
defense sector.  
As an effort to overcome its deficiencies, 
Singapore also utilized its neighboring 
countries that have good relationship with it 
such as Indonesia to be incorporated in 
defense cooperation. Defense cooperation 
between Singapore and Indonesia has been 
woven for long. It was started in 1974 and 
continued to this day. Some example 
includes Latma Indopura in the form of 
Safkar-Indopura for Army, Elang-Indopura 
for Air Force and Eagle-Indpura for marine. 
This cooperation was ended in 1980 and 
new cooperation was created in 1989 
(Ibrahim, 2015). This Military Training 
Area was unilaterally suspended by 
Indonesia in 2003 due to various violations 
conducted by Singapore in Indonesia’s 
territory and because Singapore always 
involve third party, such as United States 
and Australia, in every joint military 
exercise. Singapore then proposed newer 
and more complex defense cooperation but 
with the same substance. 
Defense Cooperation Agreement or 
DCA is a defense and security cooperation 
agreement implemented in the form of joint 
military exercise between the two countries. 
On 27 April 2007 in Bali, Indonesia and 
Singapore agreed to an agreement which 
was signed by Ministry of Defense Juwono 
Sudarsono and Singaporean Minister of 
Defense Theo Chee Hean. This DCA is 
basically a joint military exercise agenda 
scheduled for the next 25 years between the 
two countries and can be implemented after 
it has been ratified by both countries (Jha, 
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n.d.). Although it has been signed by both 
countries, DCA is required to be ratified by 
the parliaments before it can be 
implemented. When the DCA was brought 
before the parliament, majority member 
was against the agreement. 10 Years past its 
signatory, this agreement still cannot be 
realized.  
In light of that problem, there is a need 
to further study about the defense 
cooperation between both countries 
especially the defense cooperation that 
involves Indonesia so there can be a lesson 
learned from the failure of DCA with 
Singapore for the future defense 
cooperation with other countries. 
Therefore, this research will highlight the 
reason behind the failure of DCA with 
Singapore, taking into account that DCA is 
not the only cooperation that involves 
Indonesia. What makes DCA between 
Indonesia and Singapore unique is the fact 
that there is no significant implementation 
even 10 years past its signatory. The authors 
employ variables that became the factor of 
successful defense diplomacy as the tool of 
analysis in this research. 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
Research on Singapore’s defense 
diplomacy toward Indonesia to agree on 
DCA is conducted by employing qualitative 
research method through phenomenology 
approach. This approach attempts to 
understand the meaning of certain 
phenomenon and its significance to certain 
parties in certain situation (Wahyuni, 2012). 
The main function of qualitative method 
is to analyze qualitative or unquantifiable 
data. The ontology of qualitative method is 
interpretive perspective, i.e. assuming that a 
symptom is essentially holistic. Therefore, 
there is a possibility that the symptom 
cannot be measured and even observed. In 
addition, the relationship of symptoms is 
reciprocal or the data is not static and bound 
by certain value (Patilima, 2013). 
Qualitative method through 
phenomenology approach is a more 
relevant approach compared to other 
approaches in explaining the international 
relations phenomenon between Singapore 
and Indonesia. 
The data utilized in this research are 
primary data source obtained through 
interview and secondary data source 
obtained through document and literature 
review. 
Data analysis is conducted by employing 
analytical coding technique from Creswell 
with steps as illustrated in the picture below 
(Creswell, 2016): 
(1) processing and preparing data for 
analysis; 
(2) reading the overall data; 
(3) codifying or classifying data; 
(4) applying coding process to describe 
setting, participant, category and theme 
to be analyzed; 
(5) interpreting data. 
 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
This research is focusing on analysis of the 
failure of DCA between Indonesia and 
Singapore. In order to understand the reason 
behind that failure, the authors employ 
variables and values contained in that 
defense diplomacy meaning (Cottey & 
Forster, 2013) that the variables and values 
can be considered as the factor that caused 
the failure of defense diplomacy. The 
factors itself consist of Diplomacy, 
National Interest, Defense Instrument, 
Peacetime and Potential Enemy (Cottey & 
Forster, 2013). 
The first step is determining the 
problematic phenomenon and it has been 
done in the introduction section. The second 
step is explaining the complexity of the 
situation by first analyzing variables 
contained in various research questions to 
various related institutions such as Ministry 
of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
academicians, practitioners, and Indonesian 
House of Representatives. 
 
Comparison of Defense Power 
Indonesia’s national defense is arranged in 
a total defense system in order to achieve 
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national goals. At the very least, the 
national goal will always go hand in hand 
with national interest which, according to 
Defense White Paper, is maintaining the 
integrity of The Unitary State of the 
Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) in 
accordance with Pancasila and 1945 
Constitution and ensuring the 
implementation of national development 
towards the realization of national goals 
(Kementerian Pertahanan, 2015). 
Furthermore, the Defense White Paper 
also explains about defense posture which 
is directly related to defense power and 
capabilities. Defense posture is directed in 
accordance with the military and non-
military defense capabilities. This research 
will discuss about the military defense 
capabilities which is built on an ongoing 
basis and adjusted and directed to answer 
various possibilities of challenge, actual 
problem, and long-term strategic defense 
capacity building (Kementerian 
Pertahanan, 2015). 
Measuring defense power can be done 
by looking at the material resources of 
defense capabilities manifested in military 
power. However, according to Jasjit Singh, 
there are 3 things that can be a tool to 
analyze defense capabilities of a country, 
namely Manpower, Machine and Money 
(Singh, 2009). Hence, the defense power 
and capabilities of a country can be 
measured from their human resources, 
machineries (meaning technology and 
weaponries), and the budget spent by that 
country.  
Analysis of active military manpower 
(Global Fire Power TM, n.d.-b) shows that 
Indonesian manpower, based on available 
population, is less than 130 million with 
0.4% of total population or 435 thousand 
serves as armed forces. As such, despite 
being the 4th most populous country in the 
world, Indonesia is still incapable to utilize 
its human resources to strengthen its 
capabilities. 
Singapore has less manpower than 
Indonesia. Based on the total population, it 
has 1.2 million available manpower or 121st 
in the world. As for their armed forces, 
Singapore has 72,000 troops (Global Fire 
Power TM, n.d.-b). Hence in terms of 
manpower and armed forces number, 
Singapore is far below Indonesia. 
The next is machine, which is the main 
element to measure defense capabilities by 
looking at military equipment or 
weaponries. Based on the global rank, 
Indonesia is 26th for army weaponries, 28th 
for ship ownership, and 34th for aircraft 
ownership(Global Fire Power TM, n.d.-b). 
Looking at Indonesia’s land, sea and air 
capabilities, it can be inferred that 
Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI)’s power is 
weak and ineffective. Furthermore, TNI’s 
weaponries are below Minimum Essential 
Forces standard.  
Based on the number of aircraft, 
Indonesia has 441 while Singapore has 226. 
As for the number of tank, Indonesia has 
418 while Singapore has 196. Then, in 
terms of naval assets, Indonesia has 221 
while Singapore has 40. There seems to be 
a huge gap between the number of asset and 
weaponries owned by Indonesia and 
Singapore. 
The last factor is money, otherwise 
known as defense budget spent by a 
country. As has known, Indonesia’ defense 
budget is always fluctuating and it 
influences the fulfillment of defense 
posture. Meanwhile, Singapore’s defense 
budget is above Indonesia in terms of rank, 
with Singapore being 23rd while Indonesia 
is 30th (Global Fire Power TM, n.d.-b). The 
comparison between two countries’ defense 
capabilities is summarized in Table 1. 
 
Bilateral Relationship between Indonesia 
and Singapore 
It is a known fact that Indonesia-Singapore 
relations is strong and intimate, not to 
mention the two countries are neighboring 
each other and has interdependence based 
on each country’s interests. Head of 
Bilateral  I  Subdivision for  Southeast Asia
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Table 1. Defense Power Comparison 
Subject Indonesia Singapore 
GFP Rank 14 (of 133) 65 (of 133) 
Total Population 258,316,051 5,781,728 
Manpower Available 1,300,000 1,260,000 
Active Personnel 435,750 72,000 
Total Military Personnel 975,750 504,500 
Defense Budget $6,900,000,000 $9,700,000,000 
Total Aircraft 441 226 
Tank Strength 418 196 
Total Naval Assets 221 40 
Labor Force Strength 123,700,000 3,661,000 
Oil Production 789,800 500 
Oil Consumption 1,660,000 1,300,000 
Square Land Area 1,904,569 697 
Source: (Global Fire Power TM, n.d.-a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 1. Singapore’s Investment to Indonesia 
 Source: (Pol/Ant/X-3, 2017)
 
Cooperation of Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
stated that the strong bilateral relationship 
between Indonesia and Singapore can be 
seen from the intensity of meeting and 
visitation of both countries. In addition, the 
two countries have bi-annual summit 
meeting known as leader retreat. 
To be clearer, the two countries will not 
be able to have such routine meeting 
without good cooperation. This is obviously 
in line with the mutually beneficial 
cooperation between Indonesia and 
Singapore in terms of economy and 
investment. This can be seen from the 
Figure 1. 
The above figure illustrates the 
significant development of economic value 
between Indonesia and Singapore. 
Singapore is also the second biggest foreign 
investor in Indonesia. In 2014 for instance, 
Singapore’s investment realization reached 
3.4 billion or approximately 24% of total 
FDI to Indonesia (Kementerian Luar Negeri 
RI, 2014). 
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Five major investment of Singapore in 
Indonesia is transportation, warehouse and 
telecommunication, agriculture and 
plantation, food industry, mining and non-
steel industry. In addition to being one of 
the biggest investors in Indonesia, 
Singapore is also the source of tourist to 
Indonesia. The number of tourist from 
Singapore to Indonesia is about 3 million 
persons (Kementerian Luar Negeri RI, 
2014). Therefore, it can be inferred that 
relations between Indonesia and Singapore 
has been woven well and both countries are 
interdependent to each other based on both 
countries’ balance sheet of economic 
developments that are interdependent to 
each other.  
 
Defense Cooperation  
Joint Exercise Elang Indopura 1/80 TNI-
SAF 
Indonesia and Singapore has a long history 
of defense cooperation through joint 
exercise between TNI and SAF (Singapore 
Air Force). Their cooperation was named 
Latma Elang Indopura 1/80 (joint exercise 
between Indonesia and Singapore) which 
was conducted in Iswahyudi Air Force Base 
of Madiun. This exercise was consisted of 
combat training between TNI and SAF by 
using the F-86 Sabre from TNI-AU 
(Indonesian Air Force) and the Hawke 
Hunter from RSAF and conducted in 1980 
(Ibrahim, 2015). 
In the following years, the relationship 
between TNI and SAF continued to develop 
and culminated in 1989 with the 
construction of training facilities such as 
Air Weapon Range (AWR). In addition, 
they also built Air Combat Maneuvering 
Range (ACWR) for Air Force and Overland 
Flying Training Area. Those facilities were 
constructed in Indonesia’s territory, 
specifically in Pekanbaru, Riau, centered in 
Air Force Base as Detachment Squadron 
office and Joint Shelter (Ibrahim, 2015). 
 
 
 
Military Training Area 
The joint military exercise between TNI 
and SAF ultimately led to an agreement to 
create cooperation in a more complex 
military exercise. This includes Military 
Training Area (MTA) for Singapore and 
joint project to build some number of 
military exercise facilities which was 
funded by Singapore in three regions, i.e. 
Riau, Riau Islands and Baturaja in South 
Sumatera (Dewabrata, 2007). 
On 21 September 1995, Military 
Training Area agreement was adopted 
where MTA 1 is located in Tanjung Pinang 
and MTA 2 is located in South China Sea. 
This agreement was suspended by 
Indonesia in 2003 because Singapore 
violated the MTA agreement by involving 
third party such as United States and 
Australia to conduct joint exercise in 
Indonesia’s territory (Dewabrata, 2007). 
 
Defense Cooperation Agreement 
Defense cooperation in the form of Defense 
Cooperation Agreement or DCA between 
Indonesia and Singapore has been discussed 
since 2005 (Purwanto, 2006). The 
agreement between both countries was 
proposed due to the interest of both nations 
in maintaining defense partnership, 
especially Singapore which needs military 
exercise facilities. 
The DCA which was produced and 
signed in 2007 can be considered as an 
indirect barter of interest between both 
countries. In addition to strengthening 
defense cooperation between both 
countries, Singapore will provide advanced 
equipment while Indonesia will provide a 
space to simulate Singapore’s weaponries. 
The vastness of Indonesia in addition to 
close proximity of Singapore and Indonesia 
will be mutually beneficial, especially the 
DCA stated that Singapore will contribute 
to the funding of that cooperation. 
Essentially, DCA will be an opportunity 
and joint exercise facilities between 
Singaporean troops which will also 
strengthen Indonesia’s defense capabilities.  
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Table 2. Defense Cooperation Agreement 
Contents of 
DCA 
Details 
Scope of 
Cooperation 
• Regular bilateral consultations and dialogue 
• Intelligence exchange, including counterterrorism 
• Scientific cooperation in the field of technology 
• Promote human resource development 
• Student exchange of military personnel 
• Shared or separate exercises (operations and logistics) including mutual access 
to training areas and facilities 
• SAR cooperation, disaster management, and humanitarian assistance 
Exercise 
Cooperation 
• Development of training areas and facilities in Indonesia for joint TNI and 
Singapore Armed Force (SAF) exercise and provision of training assistance for 
the TNI 
• Provision of access to Indonesian air and sea territories for SAF exercise 
• Implementation of detailed exercise as stipulated in the Implementing 
Arrangement (IA) 
• SAF can exercise with third countries in Alfa 2 and Bravo areas with 
Indonesian permission 
• Indonesia reserves the right to supervise the exercises by sending observer and 
is entitled to participate in the exercise after technical consultation with the 
exercise participants 
• Third party personnel and equipment will be treated equally with Singapore's 
armed naval personnel 
Duration • Apply for 25 years 
• The parties may review the Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) and 
Implementing Arrangement (IA) once every 6 years after the initial 13-year 
term 
• DCA and IA are renewed for 6 years after each review except by mutual 
agreement 
Source: Processed by the Authors, 2018 
 
The DCA also stated joint military 
exercise between the two countries, 
meaning that this joint exercise will 
alleviate the limited defense budget of 
Indonesia. In order to ascertain the content 
of the DCA, the authors will map the 
content of DCA in the Table 2. 
The DCA is consisted of scope of 
cooperation, exercise cooperation and 
duration of the agreement. The scope of 
cooperation is consisted of forms of 
cooperation that will be developed between 
both countries such as exchange of military 
personnel, joint exercise and cooperation in 
disaster management. 
Exercise cooperation section is a specific 
section that discusses about the main 
cooperation agenda. Based on the 
explanation in this section, it can be inferred 
that the exercise area will use Indonesia’s 
territory in Alfa 1, Alfa 2, and Bravo.  
The main agenda of this joint exercise is 
the development of exercise area and 
facility in Indonesia for joint exercise 
between TNI and Singapore Armed Force 
(SAF). Singapore will commit to 90% of the 
development cost for preparing exercise 
area. The benefit for Indonesia is that the 
military base camp will belong to Indonesia 
after 25 years. 
Furthermore, it is also stated in that joint 
exercise that Singapore can invite third 
party country to be their partner in their 
exercise. However, this will require 
Indonesia’s permission as the owner of that 
area. Then, if the joint exercise will involve 
other countries, Indonesia will reserve the 
right to send an observer. At the same time, 
Indonesia must remain professional toward  
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Table 3. Process for Developing DCA 
Year Information Timeline 
2005 Official Bilateral Meeting, Singapore proposed DCA. 3 Cooperation 
agreements were agreed (defense, extradition and counter-terrorism) Pre-
Agreement 2006 Informal meeting between Singapore and Indonesia. A team from Indonesia 
and Singapore met for 4 times to produce DCA 
2007 Agreement was signed by both countries. (9-10 April) Meeting between 
Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Singaporean Deputy Prime 
Minister to discuss DCA. (July) Meeting between Indonesian Minister of 
Defense and Singaporean Armed Forces Commander-General 
Agreement 
2008 Bilateral meeting between Minister Georgte Yeo and Hassan Wirajuda to 
discuss DCA. 
Post-
Agreement 
2009 Singaporean Prime Minister affirmed Indonesia’s loss by not ratifying DCA 
due to extradition interest. 
2010 The creation of leader retreat 
2011 Meeting between Minister of Defenses, Discussion between Singaporean 
Prime Minister and Indonesian President, gift of fighter aircraft, and 
establishment of fighter aircraft instructor in Indonesia 
2012 Official summit meeting to discuss outstanding issue 
2013-
2017 
Annual Meeting/Leader Retreat 
Source: Processed by the Authors, 2018 
 
the third party involved by Singapore in 
joint exercise. 
The above explanation shows that there 
is a mutual beneficial for Indonesia and 
Singapore through this DCA. The mutually 
beneficial agreement is obviously based on 
liberalism principle that prioritizes 
cooperation for keeping peace (Jackson & 
Sorensen, 2013). The liberal principle and 
character in DCA is quite strong evidenced 
by the fact that two countries or more will 
build a mutually beneficial cooperation. 
In the case of the DCA, the content of 
that agreement is imbued strongly with 
liberalism principle. This can be seen from 
the mutually beneficial cooperation stated 
in Indonesia such as Indonesia providing 
area, and Singapore providing advanced 
facility and technology, as well as technical 
and academic assistance for TNI. 
 
Process for Developing DCA 
In order to agree on DCA, Singapore as the 
initiator conducted various activities to 
realize DCA. In addition to continuous 
diplomacy, Singapore also created 
framework for meeting between leaders of 
Indonesia and Singapore to discuss 
outstanding issue, including the delay to 
DCA. This meeting is also known as Leader 
Retreat. The authors explain the process for 
developing DCA up to the time when DCA 
was rejected by Indonesian House of 
Representatives in the Table 3. 
 
Problems Surrounding DCA 
According to Yudi Swastanto as Director 
General for Defense Strategy of Ministry of 
Defense, DCA is the umbrella for various 
agreements. But regardless of that, every 
defense cooperation have actually been 
conducted but without legal justification. 
DCA is that legal justification.  
The similar sentiment is also expressed 
by staff of Legal and International 
Agreement Division of Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs who stated that DCA is more 
expansive and comprehensive than MTA 
which only discuss about joint exercise, 
area and smaller territory, and it is also only 
for military interest. Therefore, DCA exists 
as an umbrella of other defense cooperation 
because it involves other defense 
cooperation such as exchange of 
information, capacity building, etc. 
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Based on several explanations above, it 
can be inferred that DCA is a cooperation 
truly needed by both countries to develop 
their defense. DCA is the legal umbrella for 
every defense cooperation between both 
countries and is obviously different with 
MTA. 
DCA became a problem when House of 
Representatives or parliament decided to 
not ratify the agreement. 
Yoedhi also stated that the parliament’s 
policy to not ratifying the defense 
cooperation was a political decision on the 
basis of higher interest namely extradition 
even though the extradition agreement itself 
is not under Ministry of Defense. As such, 
the Ministry of Defense as leading sector in 
this agreement was unable to do anything. 
In actuality, DCA itself has no problem. 
MTA is the problematic one. MTA was one 
of the agenda and content of the DCA. 
According to Law No. 24 of 2000 
concerning International Agreement, the 
article 10 on ratification of international 
agreement stated that an international 
agreement will be ratified if it is related to 
politics, peace, defense and state security, 
territorial change, stipulation of territorial 
demarcation, sovereignty, human rights, 
creation of new legal principles, and foreign 
aid and grant.  
The parliamentary decision to not ratify 
was caused by the following factors: 
1.  Difference of opinion between 
stakeholders. The Government of 
Indonesia was on the benefit of 
cooperation argument while the 
parliament was on the sovereignty of 
territory argument. 
2. Adverse Clauses such as Article 6 on 
Implementing Arrangement where 
Singapore has the right to conduct joint 
exercise in Indonesian territory of Alpha 
1, Alpha 2, and Bravo area; Singapore 
has the right to involve third parties in 
conducting joint military exercise in 
Indonesia; Singapore Naval Ship is 
allowed to conduct sea maneuver and 
exercise including live-fire exercise. 
3. Martial Law. 
4. Military Training Area. 
5. History of the relationship between the 
two countries. 
 
Four Variables of Successful Defense 
Diplomacy 
In this study, the authors employ liberalism 
perspective as rationale behind the analysis. 
According to Jackson & Sorensen, 
Liberalism was created on the basis of 
positive view on human nature which led to 
the assumption that international relations 
can be more cooperative instead of 
conflicting (Jackson & Sorensen, 2013). 
Therefore, Liberalism assumes state 
cooperation on the basis of that principle 
which includes peacekeeping, cooperation 
etc. 
Liberalism will lead to integration and 
cooperation. According to the liberalists, 
cooperation under anarchy and regional 
integration can prevent international war. 
This is possible because when a nation 
integrates and cooperates with other nation, 
they will know about each other’s 
characteristic and war will not occur 
between them. Therefore, derivative of this 
perspective to further the analysis is defense 
diplomacy concept. IN this case, the authors 
employ Cottey and Foster’s definition 
which stated that defense diplomacy is a 
tool to realize political goals through 
military instrument and infrastructure 
(Cottey & Forster, 2004). 
The basic question is, how can we infer 
whether a defense diplomacy is successful 
or not or variables that make such defense 
diplomacy successful. Based on Cottey & 
Foster’s defense diplomacy concept, we can 
establish variables that constitute defense 
diplomacy concept, i.e. (1) diplomacy, (2) 
national interest, (3) military instrument 
usage, (4) peacetime and former or potential 
enemy (Cottey & Forster, 2004). 
The four variables are the constitution of 
defense diplomacy. Therefore defense 
diplomacy activities can be analyzed based 
on these constitutional variables. In 
addition, these variables will lead to the 
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conclusion of whether defense diplomacy 
can be considered successful or otherwise. 
As such, the case of DCA which is a 
defense diplomacy between Singapore and 
Indonesia can be considered as a failure due 
to cannot be implemented 10 years past the 
signatory date. The following is analysis of 
that case based on the constitutional 
variables of defense diplomacy: 
 
Diplomacy 
Diplomacy is the most important element of 
foreign policy and diplomacy can also be 
considered as a tool for a state to achieve its 
national interest (Roy, 1991). Diplomacy is 
related to interstate relationship through 
negotiation and peaceful means, if possible, 
in making relationship with other countries. 
If peaceful means fail to achieve the desire 
goals, diplomacy allows the use of threat or 
real power as a mean to achieve those goals 
(Roy, 1991). 
The diplomacy aspect in this case is 
Singapore’s attempt to realize DCA with 
Indonesia which began in 2007 when 
Indonesia did not ratify this agreement even 
in the following years. The diplomacy 
aspect in this case is important because it is 
related to the national interest that will be 
achieved by each cooperating state. The 
diplomacy that is discussed in this research 
is defense diplomacy, namely diplomacy 
within diplomacy or, in other words, 
diplomacy conducted by both countries in 
realizing defense cooperation agreement. In 
this research, diplomacy is considered as a 
tool and instrument of a state. Singapore 
that has interest in DCA has conducted 
diplomacy to agree on DCA which was 
delayed due to Indonesia’s ratification 
process. This research finds that Singapore 
has exercised various diplomacies to realize 
DCA. 
Foreign Policy, DCA is one of 
Singapore’s foreign policies to weave good 
defense cooperation with Indonesia. This 
can be seen from Singapore’s statement that 
explained DCA as a mutually beneficial 
cooperation that will strengthen Indonesia-
Singapore ties (Mindef Singapore, 2007). 
Singaporean Ministry of Defense also 
stated that DCA will be the framework of 
every defense cooperation which means 
that DCA is Singapore’s interest in 
exercising its foreign policy. Hence, every 
policy related to DCA will obviously lead 
to the realization of Singapore’s foreign 
policy.  
Negotiation, is the form of diplomacy 
exercised by Singapore or, in other words, 
the mean employed in the diplomacy itself. 
In this regard, Singapore has conducted 
negotiations to agree on DCA even after the 
DCA was not ratified. This includes the 
creation of Leader Retreat as a way for 
Singapore to regain Indonesia’s attention 
after the agreement was not ratified by the 
parliament. 
Form of overseas service. Singapore 
continues to conduct overseas meeting with 
Indonesia, both in formal and informal 
manner. The meeting to discuss DCA itself 
can be done impromptu in between 
international conference or meeting by head 
of state or head of government.   
An abstract judgment. This can also 
mean expertise and shrewdness in 
negotiating. Expertise and shrewdness are 
two different things but will achieve similar 
goal. In this regard, Singapore utilized its 
bigger economic and investment power 
compared to Indonesia in order to 
strengthen its diplomacy and negotiation to 
realize DCA. 
Based on several variables above, it can 
be said that Singapore has exercised strong 
diplomacy with Indonesia, both through 
negotiations and meetings with Indonesia, 
both by head of state and head of 
government, all of which is ultimately 
employed to realize DCA. 
 
National Interest 
National interest is the main goal in creating 
cooperation especially in the case of DCA. 
There are two countries involved in DCA: 
Indonesia and Singapore. The two countries 
obviously want to realize their own national 
political interest through DCA. However, 
when the agreement has been signed and 
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agreed by both countries, the parliament of 
one of the countries did not ratify it, which 
means there is a different opinion in 
interpreting the national interest to be 
achieved through this agreement. Singapore 
based their rationale on benefit principle 
while Indonesia on state sovereignty. 
The different opinion on national interest 
ultimately became the key factor in the 
success of interstate relationship which, in 
this case, is the success of defense 
cooperation. This research finds that the 
difference of opinion between Indonesia 
and Singapore is caused by the difference of 
opinion between Government of Indonesia 
and Indonesian House of Representatives 
which causes the failure of this agreement. 
This was inferred from the internal 
meeting between the parliament and 
ministries to discuss DCA. It was then 
decided on 14 June 2007 that majority 
member of House of Representatives 1st 
Commission for defense affairs refuse to 
ratify DCA. For example, Mahfudz Siddiq 
as one of the members of House of 
Representatives who, on 4 July 2007 in 
Jakarta, stated that the government needs to 
reconsider DCA especially in regard to 
articles that has been proven 
disadvantageous for national interest 
(Kompas, 2007).  
Next in 25 June 2007, during a meeting 
between Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
Minister of Defense, House of 
Representatives 1st Commission agreed to 
reject defense cooperation agreement with 
Singapore. This rejection was made on the 
basis that Indonesia as the provider of 
exercise ground has less benefit than 
Singapore (Kompas, 2007). 
Indonesia’s national interest is obviously 
based on Pancasila and Preambles of 1945 
Constitution. However, there is a difference 
in the interpretation in this case. In order to 
explain the meaning of national interest in 
this case, the authors will relate it to 
classical liberalism theory which was 
created on the basis of positive view on 
human nature which led to the assumption 
that international relations can be more 
cooperative instead of conflicting. 
Therefore, Liberalism assumes state 
cooperation on the basis of that principle 
which includes peacekeeping, cooperation 
etc. 
Liberalism will lead to integration and 
cooperation. According to the liberalists, 
cooperation under anarchy and regional 
integration can prevent international war. 
This is possible because when a nation 
integrates and cooperate with other nation, 
they will know about each other’s 
characteristic and war will not occur 
between them. The same is also true in this 
case. Singapore and Indonesia have a long 
history of cooperation even from the early 
days of Singapore’s independence and has 
conducted various cooperation up to today. 
The authors employ liberalism’s 
assumption that legitimizes cooperation on 
the basis of mutual benefit. The same is also 
true with Indonesia which, from the 
beginning of DCA development, has 
employed mutual interest and positive view 
consideration to cooperate with each other.  
However, the internal discussion in 
Indonesian House of Representatives 
apparently resulted in differing opinion 
which reflects realist point of view. This has 
made agreement and cooperation with other 
countries impossible, especially because the 
internal of a country has contradicting view 
on certain thing. 
The same is also true in the case of 
Singapore’s desire to weave cooperation by 
using Indonesia’s territory, while Indonesia 
did not want such thing. The parliament 
believed that DCA is a defense treaty, while 
in reality DCA is a legal umbrella for any 
defense cooperation. As such, this 
difference of opinion has caused the failure 
of ratifying international agreement. 
 
Usage of Defense Instrument 
The main focus of this agreement is joint 
exercise, where it is one of the activities and 
goals of defense diplomacy itself. The use 
of defense instrument itself is part of 
defense diplomacy. However, the authors 
will explain that the use of defense 
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instrument by both countries is to agree on 
DCA. This was conducted by Singaporean 
Minister of Defense and Singaporean 
Commander-General of Armed Forces who 
attempted to talk with Indonesian Minister 
of Defense after the rejection to DCA 
ratification. This is Singapore’s attempt to 
open up new cooperation in defense 
industry and other forms of assistance to 
Indonesia. This is shown as a serious 
attempt by Singapore to realize DCA. 
 
Peacetime and Potential Enemy 
DCA was not created in the context of 
conflict between Indonesia and Singapore. 
The two countries have woven good 
relationship since Singapore’s 
independence in the 1970s which means 
that this comprehensive defense 
cooperation known as DCA was created on 
the basis of mutual trust. 
Indonesia and Singapore has never truly 
been in conflict or huge war. After all, 
Singapore’s defense capabilities are no 
match to Indonesia’s. However, in terms of 
peacetime between Indonesia and 
Singapore, it is difficult to consider the 
relationship between two countries as truly 
peaceful. Singapore does have conflict with 
Indonesia from time to time and the 
fluctuation in Indonesia-Singapore relations 
can be seen from the various unresolved 
cases between them. For example, the case 
of land reclamation conducted by Singapore 
to expand its territory. Indonesia was 
worried that Singapore’s reclamation will 
disrupt Indonesia’s territorial sovereignty. 
Singapore’s reclamation has significantly 
shifted the coastline of Singapore to the 
south or toward the territory of Indonesia 
(Juniman, 2016). In addition, the 
contemporary challenge of Indonesia is the 
control over Flight Information Region or 
FIR in Natuna region of Indonesia which is 
controlled by Singapore. Indonesia has 
been attempting to fight over the ownership 
of air space in Natuna (Kusumadewi & 
Utama, 2015). 
Defense diplomacy is not only addressed 
to friendly countries, but also countries that 
used to be former enemy and has potential 
to be future enemy. In this case, Indonesia 
and Singapore cannot be considered as an 
enemy to each other because the two 
countries have never been in an open and 
direct conflict. Assumption of potential 
enemy, both from Singapore and Indonesia, 
might be the factor behind the failure of 
DCA. 
Andi Widjayanto (from interview with 
the Authors) argued that pattern of 
friendship and hostility which can be traced 
from a country’s history is influential to that 
country’s foreign policy. Andi stated that 
state friendship and hostility can be traced 
from the history. It appears that Indonesia 
and Singapore has a history of hostility. The 
pattern of hostility with Singapore led to an 
argument that providing territory to enemy 
state for their military exercise will be 
illogical. This argument assumes that 
Indonesia should not provide exercise 
ground for a country that one day will attack 
Indonesia. Therefore, based on the 
unresolved conflict and problems between 
Indonesia and Singapore, it can be inferred 
that there is a consideration that Singapore 
will one day become an enemy to Indonesia. 
This makes it difficult for high politics 
cooperation such as the defense cooperation 
proposed by Singapore to Indonesia. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Defense diplomacy is a form of diplomacy 
that aims to achieve national interest by 
utilizing national defense instrument in 
peacetime with former and potential enemy. 
As such, the success of defense diplomacy 
can be seen from the constituting variables 
and elements of defense diplomacy itself. 
Based on defense diplomacy variable, 
the failure of DCA between Indonesia and 
Singapore is caused by the difference of 
national interest between Singapore and 
Indonesia. 
This research finds that the difference is 
caused by differing opinion between 
Government of Indonesia, particularly 
Ministry of Defense and Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, and Indonesian House of 
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Representatives. In fact, the DCA that has 
been going on for more than 10 years did 
not yield any result due to failure of 
ratification. In addition, the extradition 
agreement in DCA is also delayed because 
there was no consensus. 
Singapore has exercised strong 
diplomacy with Indonesia, both through 
negotiations and meetings with Indonesia, 
both by head of state and head of 
government, all of which is ultimately 
employed to realize DCA. 
Furthermore, the use of both countries’ 
defense instrument to agree on DCA is 
evidenced by Singaporean Minister of 
Defense and Singaporean Commander-
General of Armed Forces attempt to talk 
with Indonesian Minister of Defense after 
the rejection to DCA ratification. 
In addition, DCA was not created in the 
context of conflict between Indonesia and 
Singapore. The two countries have woven 
good relationship since Singapore’s 
independence in the 1970s which means 
that this comprehensive defense 
cooperation known as DCA was created on 
the basis of mutual trust. 
Next, defense diplomacy is not only 
created between friendly countries, but also 
between countries that used to be or could 
potentially be enemy. Based on the 
unresolved conflict and problems between 
Indonesia and Singapore, it can be inferred 
that there is a consideration that Singapore 
will one day become an enemy to Indonesia. 
This makes it difficult for high politics 
cooperation such as the defense cooperation 
proposed by Singapore to Indonesia. 
Then there is the national interest aspect 
which apparently became an important 
factor in the success of defense cooperation 
in this case. Defense diplomacy can be 
considered truly successful if it can cover 
all of the aforementioned variables. The 
authors employ liberalism’s assumption 
that legitimizes cooperation on the basis of 
mutual benefit. The same is also true with 
Indonesia which, from the beginning of 
DCA development, has employed mutual 
interest and positive view consideration to 
cooperate with each other.  
However, the internal discussion in 
Indonesian House of Representatives 
apparently resulted in differing opinion 
which reflects realist point of view. This has 
made agreement and cooperation with other 
countries impossible, especially because the 
internal of a country has contradicting view 
on certain thing. The same is also true in the 
case of Singapore’s desire to weave 
cooperation by using Indonesia’s territory, 
while Indonesia did not want such thing.  
The parliament believed that DCA is a 
defense treaty, while in reality DCA is a 
legal umbrella for any defense cooperation. 
As such, this difference of opinion has 
caused the failure of ratifying international 
agreement. 
Ultimately, DCA is an important lesson 
for Indonesia to create inter-institutional 
synergy in order to create an integrated 
opinion between institutions and agencies. 
The most important thing is ensuring that an 
agreement that has been created and agreed 
on can be easily understood by the House of 
Representatives to prevent 
misunderstanding in the agreement’s 
substance and view.  
The detailed content of DCA was the 
source of doubt for the House of 
Representatives because this agreement 
involves territorial affairs. Although MTA 
did include territorial affairs, DCA was the 
one to be problematized. It appears that the 
real problem is MTA, not DCA. After all, 
DCA is actually important as the legal 
umbrella of defense cooperation. 
Viewed from the side of international 
law, an agreement (especially defense 
cooperation) is important to be made 
because agreement will obviously contain 
rights and duties of each party and can 
prevent the risk of violation. Both Indonesia 
and Singapore requires DCA to 
accommodate their cooperation especially 
because DCA is the next level cooperation 
or high political cooperation between the 
two countries. 
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The authors argue that, in addition to 
strategic factor, there is also a material 
factor that causes Indonesia to agree on 
DCA, namely the lack of national defense 
budget in 2007. At that time, Indonesia’s 
cooperation will strengthen TNI’s 
capabilities and capacities, while Indonesia 
did not have to pay for the cost of their 
training and preparation. 
Therefore, the authors believe that the 
lack of attempt from Indonesia to resolve 
and realize this agreement can be explained. 
After all, Indonesia does not really need 
Singapore as defense partner, especially 
because Indonesia has increased its state 
budget in 2017, which is ten times bigger 
compared to 2007.  
Hence, the difference which is resulted 
from Indonesia’s internal conflict should be 
a lesson learned for Indonesia in the 
importance of finding common ground in 
national interest and what to be prioritized 
between material gain and territorial affair. 
This is also a challenge for the Government 
of Indonesia to convince the parliament in 
this case. 
 
ACADEMIC RECOMMENDATIONS 
Defense diplomacy as science is very 
lacking in Indonesia. The concept of 
defense diplomacy itself is mostly 
developed by defense studies scholars. 
Based on an interview with Andi 
Widjayanto as defense expert and scholar, it 
was found that defense diplomacy is only 
discussed by civilian scholars in Indonesia 
after 1999-2000s due to the need for 
military reform. 
Andi argued that military analysis in 
Indonesia can be divided into several 
generations. Early generation consists of 
military-scholar such as Nasution. Second 
generation is Salim Said’s generation where 
political scholars were the one who studied 
military, causing their research to be more 
about military-politics. The third generation 
is Juwono Sudarsono’s generation, who 
studied International Relations, security, 
and Indonesian military. The fourth 
generation is Andi Widjayanto’s generation 
who studied security studies and military 
defense, whose return to Indonesia made 
him realize that Indonesia is in the need of 
military reform.  The fifth generation is 
Yandry Kurniawan and Gigin CSIS’ 
generation that continued the military 
reform idea and mostly focused on its 
operationalization. 
Therefore, defense diplomacy appeared 
during the fourth generation to respond to 
Indonesia’s need of defense modernization. 
Then, there was a need to create more stable 
regional environment, followed by issues 
surrounding ASEAN Regional Forum, 
ASEAN Community etc. Furthermore, 
there was a need to transmit security sector 
to other ASEAN countries, such as 
Myanmar, which led to the creation of 
global network forum. There was also a 
need to discuss about contemporary issues 
and studies concerning hostility between 
Indonesia and Australia, Indonesia and 
Malaysia, Indonesia and China, and 
Indonesia and Singapore. Defense 
diplomacy began to become an object of 
study, but currently there are no universities 
that specifically discuss Defense 
Diplomacy outside of Indonesia Defense 
University. 
Defense diplomacy is only a concept, 
there is no theory that specifically discuss 
about whether defense diplomacy is 
successful or significant or not at all. 
Therefore, the authors recommend that 
defense diplomacy studies need to be 
further developed.  
 
PRACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
Practical recommendation is recommended 
for relevant parties in Indonesia’s defense 
diplomacy: 
1. Ministry of Defense and Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs which were directly 
involved in the making of DCA should 
be able to win diplomacy and fight for 
Indonesia’s national interest. That way, 
Indonesia will gain a 60:40 advantage 
from this agreement. Diplomatic loss in 
fighting for national interest became the 
lesson learned for Indonesia, especially 
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Ministry of Defense, to recruit people 
who have adequate capabilities in 
diplomacy and making sure whether an 
agreement can be ratified internally or 
not. 
2.  Ministry of Defense and Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs should be able to clearly 
convince and explain Indonesia’s 
national interest to the parliament that 
has the privilege to ratify international 
agreements. In the future, the case of 
signed international agreement being 
rejected by the parliament should be 
minimized. 
3.  Although normally international 
agreement does not involve parliament 
in its production, the authors recommend 
a new framework for high politics 
agreement where the parliament can be 
involved or at least notified. This should 
be considered because high politics 
cooperation is a crucial cooperation for a 
country because it is related to 
sovereignty. 
4.  Ministry of Defense as the leading sector 
in interstate defense cooperation should 
be wise in selecting which countries that 
can be a partner or friend in defense 
cooperation. After all, defense 
cooperation in the form of DCA is the 
next level cooperation between states, 
meaning Indonesia must look back at the 
history to ascertain whether a country 
could potentially be an enemy or 
otherwise. High politics cooperation 
should not only be viewed from 
liberalism perspective. 
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